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Nagy: Geduldig v. Aiello

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Geduldig v. Aiello
SEX DISCRIMINATION-State disability insurance programpregnancy-related disabilities-equalprotection-exclusion of
pregnancy and childbirth disabilitiesfrom state disability insurance program does not violate the equal protection clause. __
U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 2485 (1974).
Disability and sick-leave programs have for some time been
a common "fringe" benefit enjoyed by numerous American employees. While programs vary in scope, often with the size of the
subscribing employer, many have gotten so comprehensive that
employees are covered for even voluntarily-induced disabilities.
Many of the programs cover employees who have chosen to have
selective surgery including anything from rhinoplasty to a vasectomy.' Yet one disabling condition is frequently excluded from
disability coverage. It is unique to women and, statistically
speaking, renders the average woman disabled for approximately
six to eight weeks about three times in her lifetime.' The disability is pregnancy.
Over the course of the past two years a number of courts have
considered whether the common exclusion of disability or paid
leave for pregnant employees is unlawfully discriminatory. Most
of these courts have looked to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, with its express statutory mandate upon employers requiring equal treatment of all employees regardless of sex. 3 But
whether based on Title VII, similar state statutes, other federal
1. Consider the program discussed in Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367,
374 (E.D. Va. 1974) which had paid sickness and accident benefits for disabilities due to
alcoholism, attempted suicide, drug addiction, sterilization, and elective plastic surgery,
as well as for disability following a program of psychiatric treatment.
2. The figure for period of disability is taken from Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375
F. Supp. 367, 377 (E.D. Va. 1974) which made a specific finding of fact in that regard
based on expert testimony. The figure for the most likely number of births per woman is
derived from U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATIsIcAL ABsTRAcT OF THE UNrrED STATES, at
55 (94th ed. 1973). See also U.S. COMMISSION ON POPULATION GROWTH AND THE AMERICAN

FUTURE, POPULATION AND THE AMERIcAN FUTURE (1970).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. . ..
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statutes, or constitutional principles, nearly all have agreed that
programs which discriminate against pregnant women are unlawful. 4 Few decisions have questioned the relationship between
pregnancy and sex.' Courts have found the link to be clear; the
disability "inextricably sex-linked."' Even one of the few courts
which have denied benefits on the ground that pregnancy is not
a sickness did not question this relationship.' The reason for this
paucity of inquiry is no doubt reflected by the words of Judge
Brown, dissenting in an earlier case involving discrimination in
the hiring of women with pre-school-age children:'
The distinguishing factor seems to be motherhood versus fatherhood. The question then arises: Is this sex-related? To the simple query the answer is just as simple: Nobody-and this includes Judges, Solomonic or life tenured-has yet seen a male
mother. A mother, to oversimplify the simplest biology, must
then be a woman.
4. Scott v. Opelika City Schools, 8 FEP Cas. 272 (M.D. Ala. May 6, 1974) (42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1970)) (denial of civil rights); Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 374 F.
Supp. 1056 (D. Ore. 1974) (Title VII applicable to state and municipal employees and
educational institutions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972)) (invidious discrimination on the basis of sex held violative of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment); Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1974)
(Title VII); Farkas v. School Dist., 8 FEP Cas. 288 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 8, 1974) (Title VII
applicable to political subdivisions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970), as amended, (Supp. II,
1972)); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (Title VII);
Dessenberg v. American Metal Forming Co., 8 FEP Cas. 290 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (Title VII);
Lillo v. Bd. of Educ., 8 FEP Cas. 21 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (Title VII applicable to political
subdivisions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972)); Cedar Rapids
School Dist. v. Parr, 6 FEP Cas. 101 (Iowa Dist. Ct. 1973) (Iowa Civil Rights Law, IOWA
CODE ANN. § 601A.7 (Supp. 1974)); Black v. School Comm., - Mass. -, 310 N.E.2d
330 (1974) (violations of the equal protection and due process clauses of the United States
Constitution); In re Bd. of Educ. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 42 App. Div.2d 854, 346
N.Y.S.2d 843 (2d Dep't 1973) (Mem.) (N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1972)). But cf.
CWA v. A.T.&T. Co., Long Lines Dep't, 8 FEP Cas. 529 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 1974) (Title
VII); Newmon v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 7 FEP Cas. 26 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (Title VII).
5. Scott v. Opelika City Schools, 8 FEP Cas. 272, 274 (M.D. Ala. May 6, 1974)
("clearly. . .adversely affects women on the basis of their sex"); Farkas v. School Dist.,
8 FEP Cas. 288, 289 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 8, 1974) ("clearly discrimination based on sex");
Dessenberg v. Am. Metal Forming Co., 8 FEP Cas. 290, 291 (N.D. Ohio 1973) ("biological
fact"); Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792, 806 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (Williams, J., dissenting),
rev'd sub nom. Geduldig v. Aiello, U.S. _ , 94 S.Ct. 2485 (1974) ("exceedingly
difficult to talk about equality of treatment between the sexes when pregnancy is involved"); Cedar Rapids School Dist. v. Parr, 6 FEP Cas. 101, 102-03 (Iowa Dist. Ct. 1973)
("only women can become pregnant").
6. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 381 (E.D. Va. 1974).
7. Newmon v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 7 FEP Cas. 26 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
8. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 416 F.2d 1257, 1259 (5th Cir. 1969) (Brown,
C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), vacated and remandedper curiam, 400
U.S. 542 (1971).
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But the "simplest biology" is, legally speaking, not as simple

as it appeared to Judge Brown and a host of other judges who
considered charges of sex discrimination based on pregnancy discrimination prior to June 17, 1974. For on that day the Supreme
Court of the United States, in a 6 to 3 decision, decided that it is
clear, upon the most cursory analysis, that there is a lack of
identity between pregnancy and gender as such-at least under
a state disability program which excluded benefits for pregnancy.
As viewed by the Court,9
[t]he program divides potential recipients into two groupspregnant women and nonpregnant persons.
The ramifications of the Court's reasoning in Geduldig v.
Aiello'0 are clear upon an equally cursory analysis. Taken literally, the decision means that classification or discrimination
based on pregnancy is not sex discrimination. Since such discrimination is not sex discrimination, an aggrieved woman cannot
even raise a Title VII claim since the applicable statute deals with
"sex" discrimination, not "pregnancy" discrimination." One
court has already so held."2 But it is questionable whether the
Aiello decision must be taken so literally as to deny Title VII
relief to women discriminated against because they are pregnant.
This note will examine Aiello's assumption that special treatment of pregnant women is not sex-based discrimination, and in
particular, will consider whether such assumption should be considered a definitive holding for purposes of Title VII litigation.
In Aiello the Supreme Court considered a disability insurance system which has been administered for nearly thirty years
by the state of California. The program pays benefits to persons
in private employment who are temporarily unable to work because of disability not covered by workmen's compensation. The
system is funded entirely from contributions deducted from the
wages of participating employees. Participation in the program is
mandatory unless the employees are protected by a voluntary
private plan approved by the state. 3 The plan is set up to be
entirely self-supporting with no need for subsidization from gen9. Geduldig v. Aiello,__ U.S. __
94 S.Ct. 2485, 2492 n.20 (1974).
10. U.S. _,, 94 S.Ct. 2485 (1974).
11. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970), supra note
3.
12. CWA v. A.T.& T. Co., Long Lines Dep't, 8 FEP Cas. 529 (S.D.N.Y. July 30,
1974).
13. Geduldig v. Aiello,

-

U.S.

,

,

94 S.Ct. 2485, 2487 (1974).
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eral state revenues." The annual contribution rate is set at 1% of
income up to a maximum of $85.15 Benefits vary widely depending
on the income of the participating employee 6 and are discontinued at the end of 26 weeks.' 7 Stated exclusions include disabilities
that result from an individual's court commitment as a dipsomaniac, drug addict, or sexual psychopath.' 8 Nor are disabilities
compensable if they result from normal pregnancy and childbirth."9 It was this latter exclusion which was attacked as violative of the equal protection clause.
The fact that Aiello came to the Supreme Court in an equal
protection context is significant because the Court has been quite
explicit in its response to claims that the equal protection clause
requires changes in government spending programs so as to benefit a group or classification which believes itself unfairly deprived.
It seems quite clear that the Supreme Court will not substitute
its opinion for that of state legislatures on questions of how statecontrolled funds should be apportioned, at least in the absence
of blatant discrimination against racial or other identifiable
groups. Dandridge v. Williams,2 a case involving a limit on how
much any one family could get through the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children program, regardless of the size of the family,
set forth the Court's position. The tenor of that position was
stated ht the very beginning of the opinion:"'
This case involves the validity of a method used by Maryland,
in the administration of an aspect of its public welfare program,
to reconcile the demands of its needy citizens with the finite
resources available to meet those demands.
A paraphrase of that sentence might well have fit the opening
paragraph of the Aiello opinion. California had chosen a method
to reconcile the needs of its disabled citizens with the finite resources available to meet those demands. The opinion, read as a
whole, clearly indicates that the Court perceived the problem as
14. Id. at .. , 94 S.Ct. at 2490.
15. Id. at _..._, 94 S.Ct. at 2487.
16. In the event the employee suffers a compensable disability, he can receive a

weekly benefit amount of between $25 and $119, depending on the amount earned during
the highest quarter of the base period (one year base period prior to disability). Id. at..,
94 S.Ct at 2487, 2487 n.6.
17. Id. at _
94 S.Ct. at 2488.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
21. Id. at 472.
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a Dandridge-type problem. The focus was on the welfare-type
aspects of the fact pattern. Thus the majority acknowledged that
the program could be changed to cover the increased cost of pregnancy benefits by making reasonable changes in the contribution
rate, the maximum benefits allowable, and other variables, but
noted that each of these "variables" represents a policy determination by the state. 22 Such policies include not only the protection of disabled employees, but the self-supporting nature of the
program, and the desire to provide the broadest possible disability protection at a cost affordable by all employees, including
those with very low incomes.2 3 The "essential issue" was cast in
terms of "whether the equal protection clause requires such policies to be sacrificed or compromised in order to finance the payment of benefits to those whose disability is attributable to nor2
mal pregnancy and delivery."
The Court concluded that the excluded classification was a
"risk"-a thing to spend money on-not a group or class.2 5 The
26
Court's focus was clearly on the welfare aspects of the case:
Particularly with respect to social welfare programs, so long as
the line drawn by the State is rationally supportable, the courts
will not interpose their judgment as to the appropriate stopping
point. "[Tihe Equal Protection Clause does not require that a
State must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem
or not attacking the problem at all." Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471, 486-487 (1970).
The focus in Aiello was most certainly not on whether this
was or was not a question of sex discrimination. The majority
dealt very summarily with the issue 7 and the only real explana22. Geduldig v. Aiello, U.S.
23. Id. at -,
94 S.Ct. at 2491-92.
24. Id. at..,
94 S.Ct. at 2491.

25. Id. at.,

,

_,

94 S.Ct. 2485, 2491 (1974).

94 S.Ct. at 2492.

26. Id. at -,
94 S.Ct. at 2491.
27. One can only speculate as to the majority's reasons for summarily disposing of
the sex discrimination argument. Since Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), it
has been most unclear as to what standard should apply in equal protection cases involving sex discrimination. See Pendrell v. Chatham College, 370 F. Supp. 494, 500 (W.D. Pa.
1974) ("at least an invitation to the lower federal courts" to rule "that sex is now an
inherently suspect criteria [sic]"); Wiesenfeld v. Sec'y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 367
F. Supp. 981, 988-90 (D.N.J. 1973) (while the reasoning of a plurality does not become
law, this court was persuaded, by Mr. Justice Brennan's plurality opinion, that classification by sex is inherently suspect); Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate School Dist., 371 F.
Supp. 27, 36 (N.D. Miss. 1973)("suspect classification"); Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp.
792, 796 (N.D. Cal. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Geduldig v. Aiello, U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 2485
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tion appears in footnote 20, which claims a "lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such. . . clear upon
the most cursory analysis.""8 The analysis was indeed cursory, for
it consisted of a recitation that the "program divides potential
recipients into two groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant
female, the second
persons. While the first group is 2exclusively
9
includes members of both sexes.
The Court's analysis is disappointing because it looks only to
the superficial form of the California program. Since both men
and women are entitled to benefits for those risks which are covered,30 the Court is satisfied that no discrimination against
women exists. The opinion touched on the question of whether
the selection of risks worked to discriminate against any definable
group or class in terms of the aggregate risk protection derived by
the group or class from the program. It concluded that there was
no evidence that this was the case and that indeed, women contribute 28 per cent of the total disability insurance fund and
receive back 38 per cent of the fund in benefits.31 But the statistic
relied on is misleading, because the amount contributed by
women, based on a fixed percentage of their income, may simply
be reflective of past discriminatory employment practices against
women. In any event, the relevant inquiry should be not to comparative amounts derived from the program, but to equality of
coverage in light of the purpose of the program. That purpose,
very simply, is to protect all eligible employees from economic
hardships suffered as a result of not being able to work. The
exclusion of pregnancy benefits leaves a large gap in that purpose
-and the only ones in that gap are women. One must wonder
what the Court's reaction would have been had the only major
exclusion been sickle cell anemia. Would the Court have been
(1974) (noted "the Supreme Court's intentional restraint" from making sex a suspect
classification in Frontiero).
During the 1973-74 Term, the Court has exhibited a clear reluctance to reconsider the
applicable standard for sex-based classification. In Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur,
414 U.S. 632 (1974), for instance, the Court invalidated school board requiremenT that
pregnant teachers go on unpaid maternity leaves several months before expected childbirth. But the Court based its decision on a due process approach of hostility to "irrebuttable presumptions," 414 U.S. at 648, in spite of the fact that the issue in the lower courts
was a denial of equal protection.
.94 S.Ct. 2485, 2492 n.20 (1974).
U.S..
28. Geduldig v. Aiello, 29. Id.
30. But in fact, as pointed out in the Aiello dissent, the program covers certain
94 S.Ct. at 2493 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
disabilities unique to men. Id. at 31. Id. at -, 94 S.Ct. at 2492 n.21.
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satisfied that there was a lack of identity between the excluded
disability and race as such merely because Blacks were entitled
to benefits for those disabilities which were covered by the program? Would they be satisfied if Blacks received as much or more
than they contributed? One might say that in such a case, the
exclusion would be a mere pretext designed to effect an invidious
discrimination against the members of one race.3 2 But does discrimination require an improper motive?
In the Title VII context, where Congress has explicitly prohibited discrimination in employment practices, the Court has
found that the proper standards require more than practices
"neutral on their face. '33 The Congressional mandate for employers proscribes "not only overt discrimination but also practices
that are fair in form but discriminatory in operation." 34 The
thrust is directed "to the consequences of employment practices,
not simply the motivation."3 5 In perceiving the Aiello issue as
simply a question of how a state chooses to spend limited funds,
the Court's inquiry was confined to whether practices were neutral on their face, fair in form, and purely motivated.
If the Court is correct in its analysis that California's exclusion of disability benefits for pregnancy is not discrimination
based upon sex, the analysis would be expected to be the same
in the context of a Title VII employer-employee case. Surely sex
discrimination cannot mean one thing for equal protection purposes and another for Title VII. One should consider how Aiello
might have been decided had it come to the Supreme Court as a
36
Title VII case.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 deals explicitly with
32. Cf. footnote 20 in Aiello:

Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or
the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy
from the coverage of legislation such as this on any reasonable basis, just as with
respect to any other physical condition.
Id. at -, 94 S.Ct. at 2492 n.20.
33. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (Title VII held to prohibit
tests and other requirements for employment which discriminate against certain racial
groups and which have no relation to job performance, regardless of employer's intent in
using such tests).
34. Id. at 431.
35. Id. at 432.
36. Aiello did not come to the Supreme Court in a Title VII context because it did
not involve an employer within the meaning of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970),
as amended, (Supp. II, 1972). While a state may be an employer within the meaning of
Title VII, Aiello did not involve a complaint by state employees.
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the employment relationship. The relevant section mandates
that covered employers must not "fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
. . . sex . . . ." The Act established the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission for the purpose of administering the
law."s Guidelines promulgated by the E.E.O.C. are only interpretative, but the Supreme Court has held that they are entitled to
"great deference. ' 39
In applying Title VI's mandate for employers, the courts
have fashioned standards which permit some discriminatory
practices if such practices can be justified by business necessity.
Thus to take the classic example, it is acceptable for an employer
to fill secretarial positions by hiring only applicants who can type,
even though it may be much more difficult, for instance, for
Blacks than whites to obtain the necessary training and experience.4" But "business necessity" has been narrowly construed and
the test is not merely whether there exists a business purpose for
adhering to a challenged practice." Although Title VII refers to
the intent of an employer,42 the Supreme Court has held that
"Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of
employment practices, not simply the motivation."4 Thus courts
have held that an employer must show the existence of "an overriding legitimate business purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business."4 4 No
acceptable alternative policies or practices can be available
which would better accomplish the business purpose advanced,
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970), as amended, (Supp. IT, 1972).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972). See also 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5 (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972) which deals with the enforcement powers of
the E.E.O.C.
39. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). In exercising its interpretative function,

the E.E.O.C. has found that:
Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion, child.
birth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes, temporary disa-

bilities and should be treated as such under any health or temporary disability
insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with employment.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1973).
40. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 797 (4th Cir. 1971).
41. Id. at 798.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972).
43. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).

44. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971). See also Jones v.
Lee Way Motor Freight, 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970).
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or accomplish it equally well with a lesser discriminatory impact.45 The burden, under Title VII, is upon the employer to show
that the policy complained of is not violative of the Act.4"
An employer does not, under Title VII, necessarily insulate
himself from a violation based on sex discrimination merely by
showing that a majority of employees hired for a given position
47
are women. Thus, in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corporation,
an employer denied a charge of sex discrimination based upon a
policy of not hiring women with pre-school-age children. The
employer had prevailed in the District Court on a showing that
at the time the complainant had applied, 70-75% of the applicants for the position she sought were women, and 75-80% of
those hired for the position were women. Hence it was contended
that no question of bias against women as such was presented.
But the Supreme Court found that the Civil Rights Act "requires
that persons of like qualifications be given employment opportunities irrespective of their sex. ' 4 The employer had engaged in
one hiring policy for women having preschool age children, and
another for those men who were similarly situated.
Martin Marietta is interesting because there was a lack of
identity between the group excluded from employment and gender as such. The employer didn't discriminate against women per
se; it discriminated against women with pre-school-age children.
But since there are, in fact, men with preschool age children, the
Court was able to find discrimination. In effect, the Court looked
at a definable group (people with preschool age children) and
found different standards for men than for women in that group.
An identical analysis would seem quite impossible where the
group consists of pregnant persons.
Assuming that some comparison is necessary in order to establish discrimination, it is still possible to make comparisons by
defining the applicable group as something more expansive than
45. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971).
46. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971); Gilbert v. General Elec.
Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 381 (E.D. Va. 1974).
Closely related to the business necessity defense is the concept of bona fide occupational qualifications (b.f.o.q.) which is a comparable defense in sex discrimination cases
involving refusal to hire members of one sex for certain jobs. The courts have likewise
narrowly construed this exception to the Act. See Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel.& Tel. Co.,
408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969), rehearing denied, 471 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1973); Sprogis v.
United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
47. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
48. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).
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"pregnant persons." Gilbert v. General Electric Company" did
just that. The case involved a question of whether the employer
had violated Title VII by providing disability benefits for all disabilities except pregnancy. In finding against the employer, the
court noted:5"
While pregnancy is unique to women, parenthood is common to
both sexes, yet under G.E.'s policy, it is only their female employees who must, if they wish to avoid a total loss of company
induced income, forego the right and privilege of this natural
state . . . .Thus, women are required to undergo the economic
hardship of the disability which arises from their participation
in the procreative experience. The disability is undisputed and
inextricably sex-linked. To isolate such a disability for less favorable treatment in a scheme purportedly designed to relieve
the economic burden of physical incapacity is discrimination by
sex.
Men can become parents without a direct loss of income.
Women apparently cannot. Thus one sex is treated differently by
society than the other, though both are similarly situated-i.e.,
in the process of becoming parents. This is sophistry, of course,
because it is a "biological fact"51 that only the female parent is
disabled and hence receives no income. But it is no more sophistic
than the proposition that there is no sex discrimination where
pregnant women receive no benefits while nonpregnant persons
do. Although it can, in most cases, be said that both parents
suffer a loss of income and financial deprivation in the process of
becoming parents, the mutual loss is because her employer refuses to treat her disability as a disability. 2 In the case of women
49. 375 F. Supp. 367, 381 (E.D. Va. 1974).
50. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 381 (E.D. Va. 1974).
51. See Dessenberg v. American Metal Forming Co., 8 FEP Cas. 290 (N.D. Ohio
1973).
52. While beyond the scope of this note, it is interesting to note that the Supreme
Court failed even to consider the proposition that the California disability program places
women in the position of having to choose between employment and pregnancy, thus
curtailing their interest in having children. Such an interest has been recognized by the
Supreme Court as constitutionally protected. In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942), Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for seven members of the Court, found the interest
in procreation to be a basic one within the protection of the fourteenth amendment:
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights
of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race.
Id. at 541. This principle, so eloquently enunciated by Mr. Justice Douglas more than
thirty years ago, has proven to be a lasting one, for two years ago the Court noted:
If the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married
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having children out of wedlock, the disparity of treatment toward
people becoming parents is manifest.
Likewise the "group" may be defined as all employees, and
in fact, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 mandates that
all employees receive the same "terms, conditions, or privileges"
of employment without regard to sex.13 Since courts must look at
consequences as well as form, the relevant inquiry would seem to
be what it is that one group has which another group does not.
In many large corporations, a male employee starting with the
company has an expectation that whatever disability may jeopardize his livelihood, he will be protected from both ruinous financial loss and jeopardization of career potential by company
rules which pay his income and protect his seniority rights while
he is necessarily out of work. But a female employee cannot enjoy
the same expectation if she is of child-bearing age. If she becomes
pregnant (and a statistically verifiable number of American
women will become pregnant)she will forfeit her income and possibly her seniority rights. The relevant question, in the words of
Title VII, is whether she is discriminated against with respect to
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
because of her sex. One court, in Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins.
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child.
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
A recent decision concerning the validity of a school system's policy of terminating a
teacher's employment at the end of the sixth month of pregnancy took into consideration
the principle espoused in these two Supreme Court cases and, in addition, considered an
even more recent Supreme Court decision, which held that a woman has a constitutional
right to terminate her pregnancy. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In light of all the
relevant precedents, the court concluded:
If the right to maintain freedom from interference with terminating a pregnancy
is a right of the magnitude described by the Supreme Court. . . certainly the
interests here involved is [sic] entitled to at least similar recognition.
Buckley v. Coyle Public School System, 476 F.2d 92, 96 n.3 (10th Cir. 1973). See also Black
v. School Comm., __
Mass. -,
310 N.E.2d 330 (1974), where the court held that
teachers were entitled to sick pay whether or not one bases the holding on a theory of sex
discrimination or on a notion that denial burdens fundamental freedom of choice in
marriage and family life.
But considerations such as those were not even considered by the Court in Aiello,
which perceived discrimination not against "persons or groups," but only an "asserted
under-inclusiveness of the set of risks that the State has selected to insure." Geduldig v.
U.S. -,
_ 94 S.Ct. 2485, 2491 (1974). Had the Court approached the
Aiello, issue from the standpoint set out above, it is presumed that the burden would have
shifted, with the State being required to show a compelling interest for its interference
with so fundamental a right as whether to bear or beget a child.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970), supra note 3.
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Co.,-" heard the argument that exclusion of pregnancy benefits
did not constitute sex discrimination because pregnancy is sui
generis. The court responded by taking judicial notice of the fact
that pregnancy is certain to occur in a statistically expectable
number of employees and that pregnancy is a condition limited
to women by "biological law." 5 One may infer that the court
found discrimination in the fact that the employer's plan was
intended to cover all disabled employees but excluded a sizeable
number of women who, statistically speaking, would in fact be
disabled.
In the disability plan at issue in Wetzel, and in many large
disability plans, a "term, condition, or privilege" of employment
is the expectation that disabilities, incurred for whatever reason,
will not be financially ruinous. This is, however, an expectation
for male employees, not female employees."
It could be said that an employer who covered every conceivable disability except pregnancy, and who included both men and
women equally as recipients of the benefits therein, was "neutral," that said policy is "fair in form," and that no improper
motivation is evidenced. The Supreme Court believed California's disability insurance plan to be such. The context in which
Aiello came before the Court was such that considerations of
whether the Court should tell a state how to spend its money were
paramount in the minds of the majority. But the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 requires more than neutrality, more than fairness in form,
and more than pure motivation. Employment practices which
cover male employees for whatever disability, yet deny coverage
to females for a condition to which they alone are heir, are inherently discriminatory. The consequence of these practices is to
perpetuate a history of inequality based on inherent physical
characteristics and indeed to penalize certain employees for being
57
women.
54. 372 F. Supp. 1146 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
55. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146, 1158 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
56. The discriminatory nature of employer policies which single out pregnancy for
special treatment is even more obvious in the case of "sick pay." Frequently, employees
will be entitled to a certain number of "sick days" per year and these are often cumulative,
so that an employee who has remained healthy for several years will be well covered should
he become temporarily disabled. Since each employee is guaranteed so many days sick
leave per year, it should make no difference to the employer why an employee wishes to
use his sick days-so long as the employee is genuinely disabled and unable to work. Yet
here again, pregnancy has frequently been an excluded disability. See In re Bd. of Educ,
v. State Div. of Human Rights, 42 App. Div.2d 854, 346 N.Y.S.2d 843 (2d Dep't 1973).
57. See Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 374 F. Supp. 1056, 1063 (D. Ore.
1974).
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Pregnancy Disability
It is unfortunate that the majority included footnote 20 in the
Aiello decision, since the narrow view expressed therein as to
what constitutes sex discrimination is at odds with the broader
and more enlightened view articulated by the Supreme Court in
interpreting the mandate of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.58 The
Aiello decision can and already has proven stultifying to federal
courts considering cases arising under Title VII of that Act.59
Even had the majority admitted that California's policy did discriminate against women, it might have found, on a Reed v.
Reed"0 analysis, that the challenged classification was reasonable

and substantially related to the object of the legislation.
Courts, in considering the validity of comprehensive disability or paid sick leave programs which exclude disability due to
pregnancy, should not consider footnote 20 of Aiello to be the
definitive word on whether pregnancy discrimination is sex discrimination." They should look to the consequences of such an
exclusion: that male employees are covered for all disabilities
while female employees are not; that female employees are expected to drop out of the work force once they become parents

while male employees are not;62 and the fact that women are
penalized financially because they alone get pregnant. Read as a

whole, Aiello indicates that the Court's focus was on the similarity of California's program to other welfare-type programs. The
58. See notes 33-35 infra and accompanying text. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971).
59. See CWA v. A.T.& T. Co., Long Lines Dep't, 8 FEP Cas. 529 (S.D.N.Y. July 30,
1974) where the court interpreted Aiello to mean that denial of pregnancy benefits is not
sex discrimination. The court "illustrated" the Supreme Court's point by stating that "a
woman's organization (e.g. a woman's club or actresses' workshop) could hardly be taxed
with discriminating on grounds of sex (or gender) if its medical insurance policies provided
no coverage for pregnancy-related disabilities." Id. at 531 n.1. But then neither would
there be racial discrimination in a land where all were one race.
60. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See also Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920).
61. One recent case, Vineyard v. Hollister School Dist., 8 FEP Cas. 1009 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 1, 1974), has indeed taken this tack and distinguished Aiello on the ground that it
was decided in a different analytical framework than that faced by courts in Title VII
cases.
62. It is a common sexual stereotype that a woman's place is in the home with her
children. One may infer that this stereotype is one of the reasons why pregnancy has not
been thought of as just another disability by employers. For example, in Gilbert v. General
Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 378 (E.D. Va. 1974), the employer believed that 40% of its
women employees who take maternity leave do not return. It contended, therefore, that
disability benefits would be the equivalent of giving women termination pay benefits not
available to non-pregnant employees. But the court pointed out that the termination pay
problem exists with all workers who do not return to work following sickness or accident.
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focus was certainly not on whether such a program is or is not sex
discrimination.
John D. Nagy
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